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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

31 December 1952

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 301

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem on NIE-69: "Probable Developments in North Africa," dated 12 September 1952

It is recommended that the following memorandum be sent to the IAC agencies:

"1. Initiation of NIE-69 was authorized by the IAC on 24 April 1952 to serve as the intelligence backing for a projected NSC policy statement. Contributions were received by 2 July and an initial staff draft submitted to the Board of National Estimates on 14 July. The estimate was approved by the IAC on 4 September.

"2. Intelligence Gaps. No critical intelligence gaps were uncovered in the preparation of NIE-69, but more complete intelligence coverage on the following topics seems desirable in view of the probable future developments in this important area:

"a. The leadership and aspirations of the nationalist movements and their popular support; cooperation or rivalries between the movements and cliques

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒

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within them; the role of the nationalist committees outside North Africa; the strength and influence of the ulama in Algeria; and the extent to which nationalism has affected French ability to play off Berbers against Arabs.

"b. Communist strength and capabilities, including the relative proportion and influence of native and non-native membership, and of outside support and direction; the extent of Communist infiltration of the nationalist movements and of their cooperation with them; and the extent of Communist influence in the labor unions.

"c. The French stake in the North African economies, including the level of French budgetary contributions and of French investment; also the role of the "colons" in ownership and investment, the distribution of power between the colons and French officials, and their role in the formulation of French policy.

"We believe that the agencies concerned are already aware of the need for more information on these subjects and will take the

- 2 -

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
necessary remedial measures. Therefore, a special post-mortem meeting seems unnecessary in this case.

"3. Recommendations

"a. That no special post-mortem meeting be held on NIE-69.

"b. That the IAC agencies note the above intelligence needs and take whatever research and collection measures seem necessary to fill them."

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- 3 -

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